Can Artificial Intelligence Be an “Officer in Default”? Rethinking Corporate Liability under the Companies Act, 2013

Subject area: Law and Legal Studies DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24299273

38 Views
18 PDF downloads
— Citations (soon)

Abstract

According to the Companies Act, 2013, liability in a corporation is not introduced to the corporation as an abstract person rather it is imposed on the individuals, described as “officers who are in default”, through the definitions of the word “officer” in Section 2(59) and “officer who is in default” as defined in Section 2(60). That means a human agent is assumed to be knowledgeable and exercising autonomy in making decisions, giving consent to comply with statutory obligations, being aware of a default through Board meetings and possessing sufficient mens rea that would entail imprisonment or payment of fines, as stated in Sections 447 to 451 of the Act. This assumption is gradually being questioned with the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into compliance, reporting, risk assessment, and making decisions at the Board level, which finds its roots in Lennard’s Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co.
If a company acts in a certain way due to an AI system rather than a named officer, it will strain the whole statutory framework for attributing wrongdoing. It would be difficult to call a system that does not have legal personality, mens rea, or capacity to give written consent an “officer in default.” In this paper, I analyze each statutory element of Section 2(60)—legal personality, prior written consent, deemed knowledge based on the Board proceeding, and the discretionary relief under Section 463 for officers that behaved honestly and reasonably—and demonstrate that none of these elements can be applied to this kind of non-sentient AI system without tearing apart the protective measures that Parliament intentionally included in this legislative provision.
It also analyzes the various responses to the idea of AI accountability, namely the European Parliament’s 2017 suggestion to create an entity called ‘electronic person,’ the accountability framework established in the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, the notion of ‘shadow director’ in England and the Indian approach to the matter (with reference to SEBI’s framework on trading through algorithms). It then proceeds to define what the author refers to as ‘the accountability gap,’ which refers to the diffuse responsibility and also to the problem of ‘liability laundering.’ To address this gap, the author comes up with reforms proposed based on the current legislation.

Cite this article

Aastha Baru (2026). Can Artificial Intelligence Be an “Officer in Default”? Rethinking Corporate Liability under the Companies Act, 2013. International Innovations & Scholarly Trends Journal, 2(11), 321–328. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24299273

Share

Copyright & License

© 2026 — Authors retain the copyright of this article. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 4.0) , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.